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SUPREME COURT - STATE OF NEW YORK
DUTCHESS COUNTY
Present:
Hon. JAMES V. BRANDS
Justice.
SUPREME COURT: DUTCHESS COUNTY

--------------------

x

Petitioner,

DECISION AND ORDER
Index No: 2018-50332
DIN# 04-A-3 109
ORI#NYOI30I5J

-againstTINA M. STANFORD, Chair of the New York
State Parole Board,

____________________

Respondent.

x

The following papers were read and considered on this Article 78 petition.
NYSCEF Doc. No. 1-34
Background Facts:
Following a bench trial, petitioner was convicted of Murder in the Second Degree that
stemmed from an incident that occurred on June 18, 2002. Petitioner learned that his girlfriend
discovered that he was dating another woman. On the date of the incident, Petitioner drove from
work to his girlfriend's house, where he agreed to help his girlfriend drop off her three-year old
daughter to her caretaker. He retrieved a knife from the kitchen before they departed to the
caretaker's house. His girlfriend exited the vehicle to drop her child off with the caretaker and,
as she returned to the vehicle, petitioner "lost it" and stabbed her 141 times with the knife and
left her at the scene with fatal wounds.
Petitioner's defense of extreme emotional disturbance was rejected at trial. During the
sentencing phase, the court ordered a psychological evaluation of petitioner to be considered in
connection with determining the appropriate sentence. Petitioner was sentenced to a term of 15
years to life.
At issue is the Parole Board Release Interview dated May 23, 2017 which concluded with
a denial of parole release. Said determination was affirmed on appeal.
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Petitioner filed the instant Article 78 petition challenging the foregoing determinations.
He contends that the review board failed to consider the requisite factors set forth in Executive
Law 259-i. In that regard, petitioner claims that the review board excessively weighed the factor
of the severity of the petitioner's crime without adequate consideration to the petitioner's
positive institutional history, progressing maturity, and remorse. He further contends that. the
determinations were arbitrary and in violation of the 20 I I Amendments to the parole regulatIOns
in that petitioner alleges that the determination was not an objective "evidence based"
assessment. In support of the instant application, counsel cites the recent decisions rendered in
the Maller of Kellogg v New York State Bd. of Parole, 159 A.D.3d 439 [I" Dept. 2018] and
Maller of Butler v NYS Board of Parole, Sup Ct. Dutchess County, Index No. 2703/2017.
Decision:
The proper standard of review for parole board interviews is whether the decision is
irrational so as to border impropriety (see Russo v NYS Board of Parole, 427 N.Y.S.2d 982
[1980]; Cruz v Travis, 273 AD2d 648 [3'd Dept. 2000]).
Executive Law S259-i[2][c] requires the consideration of several statutory factors,
including the inmate's institution record and seriousness of the offense. (fd.). Executive Law
S259-c[4] was amended in 20 II to implement a more objective assessment of the statutory
factors by the Board through the adoption of the COM PAS (Correctional Offender Management
Profiling for Alternative Sanction) assessment tool. The parole board may exercise its discretion
in detemlining that the severity of the crimes outweighs the inmate's achievements while
confined, and doing so does not render the denial of parole irrational or improper. (Maller of
Kirkpatrick v. Travis, 5 A.D.3d 385 [2,d Dept. 2004], People ex rei. Yates v Walters. III A.D.2d
839 [2,d Dept. 1985]). The Board has the discretion to "place a greater emphasis on the gravity
of [the] crime" when weighing the statutory factors (Maller of Perea v Stanford, 149 A.D.3d
1392 [3d Dept. 2017]; see also Maller of Kirkpatrick v. Travis, supra.). A Board has discretion to
determine whether to grant parole release upon due consideration of the statutory factors, and
such determination is not subject to judicial reviw absent "a showing of irrationality bordering
on impropriety" (Maller of Russo v NYS Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 77 [1980]).
The record reflects the Board considered the COMPAS Risk and Needs Assessment
instrument in conjunction with the statutory factors including the petitioner's institutional record,
seriousness of the criminal offense, disciplinary record, and considerations for the successful reenty into the community. The Board acknowledged petitioner's accomplishments as set forth on
the COM PAS report. The Board properly balanced same against the interests of public safety. In
that regard, the Board noted petitioner stabbed his victim 141 times in a "fit of rage" (Tr.' at
page 6), the trial court found that "the evidence did not support the ...claim of extreme emotional
disturbance" (Tr. at page 20), and the Board recognized that petitioner has not sought the type of

, Referencing the transcript ("Tr.") of the Parole Board Interview held on 3/23/2017 filed as

NYSCEF Doc. NO.4.
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psychiatric intervention as contemplated by the sentencing judge for petitioner who has been
classified as 'mental health level 6'. (Tr. at page 21-22). The Board remained concerns about
petitioner's "potential for losing it" (Tr. at page 26). The Board weighed "petitioner's
demonstrated capacity for extreme and disproportionate violence in response to seemingly minor
emotional challenges", in this instance learning that his two girlfriends knew of each other
prompted him to stab one of his girlfricnds a total of 141 times. (Respondent's Answer ~9).
In sum, the record before this court demonstrates that the Board's denial of parole was
amply supported by the evidence before the Board and was made in accordance with statutory
requirements. Absent any showing that the Board's determination was so irrationally based that
it borders on impropriety, the Board determination is not subject to judicial scrutiny (see
generally Maller of Ganci v Hammock, 99 A.D.2d 546 [2"d Dept. 1984], citing Executive Law
259-i[5], Maller of Bacon v Hammock, 96 A.D.2d 557 [2"d Dept. 1983], Maller of Delman v
NYS Bd. of Parole, 93 A.D.2d 888 [2"dDept. 1983]).
In so holding this court distinguishes the factual circumstances in this matter from those
presented in the petitioner's cited cases (see Maller of Kellogg v New York State Bd. of Parole,
159 A.D.3d 439 [1'( Dept. 2018]; Maller oj Butler v NYS Board oj Parole, [Supreme Court,
Dutchess County Index No. 2703/2017]).
In Maller of Kellogg, the parole board failed to appreciate that petitioner was convicted
of second-degree murder based on strict vicarious liability that stems from a burglary, which
does not require a showing of intent. Instead. the Board mis-characterized the conviction as one
of intentional murder by giving weight to the fact that "they [the Board] did not see where [she
had] admitted to being such a bad person" (Maller of Kellogg, 159 A.D.3d at 440) and
emphasizing that "petitioner had failed to admit responsibility for the crimes she had been found
guilty of committing" (id. at 441). In contrast, the record in the instant matter is devoid of any
such mis-characterization of the conviction.
In Maller of Butler. the court held that the "Board's failure to articulate in its written
decision any facts other than the recitation of petitioner's crimes of conviction and prior criminal
record require this court to remand the matter" [for a denovo determination]. (Maller oj Butler v
NYS Board oj Parole. supra. at 4). In contrast, the Board's written decision in connection with
the instant matter cited several factors considered, including "heinous nature" of the petitioner's
conduct, the severity of the crime, the lack of remorse stated as petitioner having "exempted
himself from the moment of the crime", concerns over public safety, concerns of petitioner's
mental health and lack of mental health intervention prior to the requested parole release, while
also considering petitioner's
accomplishments
including "institutional
adjustment; an
Associate's Degree; vocational and behavioral reports, documents of support and of opposition
and the low COMPAS scores". (Tr. at p. 24-26).
Based on the foregoing, it is hcreby
ORDERED that the petitioner's application is denied and this matter is dismissed.
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The foregoing constitutes the decision and order of this court.
ENTER:

Dated: Mayc1L, 2018
Poughkeepsie, New York

Kathy Manley, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner
26 Dinmore Road
Selkirk, NY 12158
Tina M. Stanford
Chair, NYS Parole Board
Harriman State Campus - Building 2
1220 Washington Avenue
Albany, NY 12226-2050
Attorney General of New York State
I Civic Center Plaza, Suite 40 I
Poughkeepsie, NY 1260 I
Dutchess County Clerk
22 Market Street
Poughkeepsie, NY 1260 I
Pursuant to 22 NYCRR 671.5, please be advised that you have the right to appeal, or to apply for
permission to appeal, this order to the Appellate Division, Second Department, 45 Monroe Place,
Brooklyn, New York, 11201. Upon proof of your financial inability to retain counsel and pay the
cost and expenses of the appeal, you have the right to apply to the appellate court for assignment
of counsel and leave to prosecute the appeal as a poor person. CPLR Section 5513 provides that
an appeal may be taken, or motion for permission to appeal may be made, within thirty (30) days
after the entry and service of any order or judgment from which the appeal is taken, or sought to
be taken, and written notice of its entry.
When submitting motion papers to .Judge Brands'
copies. Submit only the original papers.
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